Transposition Beyond Policy Legacies and Veto Players? The Case of Anti-Discrimination Policy in Austria by Juan Casado Asensio
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLV, (2008.), No. 5, pp. 153–174 153 
                                                                                                                            
Minority policies 
                                                                                                                            
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
323(436):061.1 EU 
Primljeno: 31 October 2008 
                                                                                                                            
 
Transposition Beyond Policy Legacies and Veto 
Players? The Case of Anti-Discrimination Policy in 
Austria* 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
JUAN CASADO ASENSIO** 
 





 The transposition of European Union directives involves the re-
conciliation of domestic and European interests. More often than not, 
domestic politics overrule European requirements to comply in a 
timely and correct manner. This domestication of the transposition 
process has often been observed in states belonging to the “world of 
domestic politics”, one of the least researched country clusters in the 
“worlds of compliance” typology developed by Falkner et al. (2005). 
This paper provides additional empirical evidence on how domestic 
politics overrule European demands once a conflict between both le-
vels occurs. This is done with the study of the transposition of two 
EU Anti-discrimination directives in Austria. There, transposition had 
to overcome two types of conflict. On the one hand, a policy legacy 
diametrically opposed to anti-discrimination; on the other hand, an 
actor constellation ideologically contrary to anti-discrimination law. 
Based on the empirical material presented here, the paper suggests a 
number of strategies on how to further extant theoretical contributi-
ons in the field of transposition studies. 
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Introduction 
 The transposition process refers to the measures governments undertake 
to translate external legal commitments into domestic laws and policies (Un-
derdal, 1998: 26). In the European context transposition refers to the domes-
tic process of adaptation of a policy and/or organisational component to the 
binding pressures of European integration. It constitutes the first step in the 
implementation of European law and policy and is divided into an adminis-
trative and a political phase (Falkner et al., 2005: 324). During the adminis-
trative phase, reform requirements are identified and the process leading 
towards adaptation is initiated. The political phase involves politicians, inte-
rest groups and other domestic actors.  
 The timing and final outcome of transposition falls under the competence 
of EU supranational actors (i.e. the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice), which react against transposition delays and evaluate out-
come correctness. This is why transposition is usually modelled as a “two-
level game” between Member States and EU organisations (Putnam, 1988). 
Twice before the transposition deadline, the European Commission reminds 
the Member States of their obligations to transpose and to specify which na-
tional measures have been taken. This reminder function of the Commission 
is meant to put pressure on the Member States to proceed further with their 
duties and may impact upon the process and outcome of transposition. In 
addition to this, when a directive is not properly transposed (e.g. if delayed 
and/or incorrectly transposed), the Commission has other dissuasive legal 
tools (Tallberg, 2002: 609). These may lead to the imposition of financial 
penalties by the European Court of Justice (see Börzel, 2001).  
 Despite having such mechanisms, domestic politics often overrule the 
requirements embodied in a European directive. This is especially true in 
some Member States (Falkner et al., 2005). According to the “worlds of 
compliance” approach, Member States belong to a country cluster with a 
typical domestic pattern of reacting to EU induced reform requirements 
(Ibid., 318). In the “world of law observance”, transposition is generally cor-
rect and on time, determined by a strong culture of compliance. In the 
“world of transposition neglect”, timely and correct transposition is rare and 
transposition is often triggered by supranational pressure. Finally, states in 
the “world of domestic politics” fluctuate between these “worlds” in terms 
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of transposition performance.1 In this “world”, complying with EU 
requirements does not constitute a priority and is largely dependent upon 
domestic actors, and in particular the ideology of political parties in gover-
nment. These are usually the only actors with the right of veto over the pro-
cess and/or outcome of transposition (see Tsebelis, 1995, 2002; Haverland, 
2000). Importantly too, domestic policy legacies – measured by the classical 
misfit hypothesis – also matter most in this country cluster.2  
 The “world of domestic politics” is the most inconclusive of all “worlds 
of compliance”, and as such requires additional empirical investigation. This 
paper provides additional empirical evidence on how domestic actors over-
rule European demands once a conflict emerges between both levels in this 
“world”. This is done with the study of the transposition of two anti-discri-
mination directives in Austria, namely the Race Directive (RD)3 and the 
Employment Framework Directive (EFD).4 Transposition in Austria had to 
overcome the double burden of a diametrically opposed anti-discrimination 
policy legacy, and a constellation of veto players ideologically contrary to 
the comprehensive reform demanded by the anti-discrimination directives. 
The case of Austria provides interesting clues on how to proceed with the 
theoretical filling of this cluster in future research endeavours.5  
 The Anti-discrimination directives (ADDs) regulate several grounds of 
anti-discrimination at once, expanding the levels of protection to numerous, 
potentially vulnerable communities in employment, occupation, vocational 
training, membership of employer and employee organisations, social pro-
tection, including social security, health care and education. In addition, for 
the RD, rights were extended to the access to goods and services available to 
the public, including housing. While the EFD covers the grounds of age, be-
lief, disability, religion and sexual orientation, the RD covers the grounds of 
ethnicity and race.6 The RD had to be transposed by July 2003 and the EFD 
 
1 In addition, there is a “world of dead letters”, where transposition is generally correct and 
on time, but the later stages of application and enforcement that belong to the broader imple-
mentation process are deficient (Falkner, Treib, 2007). For transposition, however, states classi-
fied under this country grouping behave as in the “world of domestic politics”.  
2 The misfit hypothesis looks at how much domestic policy legacies fit with incoming 
European requirements (for a review see Casado Asensio, 2008).  
3 Directive 2000/48/EC, OJ L 180, 19.07.2000, 22. 
4 Directive 2000/43/EC, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, 16. 
5 The empirical material presented here is based on expert surveys on the basis of semi-
structured questionnaires, as well as the use of process tracing through a variety of secondary 
sources (e.g., ministerial documents, party programmes, parliamentary debates, newspaper arti-
cles). 
6 A deeper and more sophisticated analysis of the ADDs can be found elsewhere (Wadding-
ton, Bell, 2001). 
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by December 2003, except for the grounds of age and disability, which could 
be transposed until December 2006 upon Member State’s request. The 
ADDs are two directives in the field of EU social policy and labour law that 
have hitherto received scant scholarly attention. They go beyond traditional 
conceptions of supranational social policy and labour law. Indeed, the Euro-
pean Commission placed ideational and social citizenship logics ahead of the 
economic logic of correcting market externalities for an area that is not 
directly linked to the creation of a single market (Bell, 2002). The Commis-
sion emphasised timely and correct transposition and more resources than 
usual in monitoring Member State developments. Thus, supranational orga-
nisations were expected to follow transposition closely and, if required, to 
intervene domestically to rectify deviance. 
 The formation of a coalition government between the Austrian People’s 
Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in the year 2000 trigge-
red “exceptionally strong [European] reactions” (Leconte, 2005: 620) aga-
inst Austria. It was the first time that an extreme right party entered gover-
nment in Western Europe since the end of World War II. Although Austria 
was threatened with sanctions, it was never denied its position as a legiti-
mate member of the Union. These events had a decisive impact on suprana-
tional decision-making of European anti-discrimination legislation, on the 
pipeline at that time in Brussels. The EU was indeed negotiating an anti-dis-
crimination package, consisting of these two directives and a Community 
Action Programme. Although the EU covered anti-discrimination from the 
labour law perspective, these initiatives were meant to constitute unique ad-
ditions to the European legislative landscape. Yet, given domestic events in 
Austria, its representation in Brussels was unable to influence the negotia-
ting process, fearful of appearing as European “brakeman” on this sensitive 
issue (Geddes, Guiraudon, 2004). Domestically, anti-discrimination legisla-
tion was, by and large, a foreign affair and the governing parties had not put 
forward autonomous plans to pass anti-discrimination legislation. As a re-
sult, the transposition process was expected to be “spirited” and “complex” 
(Interview AT2), and the role of the Commission to be “intrusive” and “me-
ticulous” (Interview AT5).  
 This paper investigates these issues in four sections. It first presents a bri-
ef review on how Austria transposes EU legislation. The second section de-
picts the state of anti-discrimination legislation and policy in Austria before 
the transposition process kicked off. This overview of the domestic policy 
legacy will illustrate the first type of conflict that Austria had to overcome 
during transposition. Third, the paper looks at the formal transposition pro-
cess and outcome attained, with particular emphasis placed on the role of 
domestic veto players and their ideology, the second conflict encountered 
during transposition. The final, concluding section discusses how the empi-
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rical findings presented here can assist in future theory-making in the field of 
transposition studies. 
 
Transposition of EU law and the Austrian political system 
 Austria is a country with a strong legal positivism. Article 18 of the Con-
stitution prescribes that all acts of the public administration be based on law 
(Jenny, Müller, 2005: 4). The Constitutional Court enforces this Article 
rigorously and all EU directives, therefore, take the form of a law passed by 
the Austrian Parliament. The Parliament consists of two chambers, the 
directly elected Nationalrat and the indirectly legitimised Bundesrat, which 
is made of representatives of the nine Austrian Länder. Although being 
constitutionally federal, rulemaking in Austria has been increasingly centra-
lised. The Länder have only limited powers, which have been further redu-
ced after accession to the EU (Falkner, 2001: 3; Hegeland, Neuhold, 2002: 
1).  
 The national division of tasks in transposition of EU law, as laid down in 
the Constitution and the Federal Ministries Law, establishes responsibilities 
at Ministerial and Länder level. The Federal Ministries Law was amended in 
2003 to better coordinate ministerial and regional competences with the Fe-
deral Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt). As a result, the Chancellery became 
an active part in most transposition processes, which supposed a tighter 
oversight of the work of the ministries during transposition (Interview AT4). 
One of the first results in this respect was a reduction in over-implemented 
laws. In addition, Länder governments also have to implement parts of EU 
directives, notably those concerning the labour law of their bureaucracies 
and civil servants.  
 Austria is a strong corporatist state with over sixty years of history of so-
cial dialogue (EIRR, 2006: 3). Its corporatist system has a “distinctive 
capacity to mobilize political consensus for change [by providing] for a 
politically safe release of political tension (…) and a means for containing 
escalating conflicts” (Katzenstein, 1984: 136). This system is well-develo-
ped both structurally with an extensive social partner set up, and 
procedurally through the involvement of these interest groups at different 
stages of domestic policy-making and transposition (Falkner, 2001: 6; Fal-
kner et al., 2005: 250). There are several hierarchically organised chambers 
where membership is obligatory, the most important being the 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKÖ, Chamber of Commerce), the Indus-
trielle Vereinigung (IV, Federation of Austrian Industry), the Arbeiterkam-
mer (AK, Chamber of Labour), the Landwirtschaftskammer Österreich 
(Conference of Presidents of the Chambers of Agriculture), and the 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB, Austrian Trade Union Confede-
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ration). These organisations cooperate formally and informally on a daily 
basis and are used to draft all legislation related to the management of capi-
tal and labour. The output of these meetings is then negotiated in a tripartite 
manner with the relevant ministry before it is handed over to the Parliament. 
Even the two largest political parties, the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Österreichs (SPÖ, Austrian Social Democratic Party) and the Österreich-
ische Volkspartei (ÖVP, Austrian People’s Party) have subsidiary organisa-
tions representing the interests of labour and business, thus completing a 
relatively dense social partnership picture. With EU accession, social par-
tners lost part of their influence as some of their domestic policy-making 
competences were transferred to the EU level (Falkner, 2001: 6). Their 
powers have since then further eroded, notably after the arrival of the coali-
tion formed by the ÖVP and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ, Au-
strian Freedom Party).  
 This government ended the stable “grand coalition” politics that had hit-
herto characterised the Austrian political scene (Kritzinger, Michalowitz 
2005: 4; Pelinka, 2005). Indeed, since 1955 the ÖVP and SPÖ had been 
relatively often in a “grand coalition” government, which also explains the 
Austrian consensual culture and its tradition of coalition discipline (Falkner, 
2001: 8). The arrival of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in the year 2000 was trau-
matic for Austrian labour unions and social policy advocates. The gover-
nment changed around 120 laws to restructure and cut back the welfare state. 
They also merged the ministries of economy and labour, circumvented and 
deliberately obstructed workers’ organisations (Obinger, 2002: 29). The co-
alition had declared its hostility to the Austrian social partnership system 
(Falkner, Leiber 2004: 251). As a member of the Austrian Green Party dec-
lared, the obligatory period of consultation or Begutachtung for domestic 
actors to give an opinion on draft laws, and “the possibility of negotiating as 
it were, at the tripartite level, now depends on how much the government is 
willing to involve [them]” (Interview AT3). The reality also deteriorated for 
civil society and the NGO community who had never been guaranteed a 
formal supply of information or consultative rights in the past, thus making 
it harder for them to have a real impact upon legislative outcomes. The tran-
sposition of EU directives constituted, nevertheless, an area where domestic 
public-private cooperation remained relatively intense compared to other 
areas of domestic policy-making. Thus, the arrival of the ADDs coincided 
with a “unique [context] in the history of the Second Republic [of] ret-
rench[ment] and restructuring [of] the Austrian welfare state” (Obinger, 
2002: 27), and in terms of changing domestic politics.  
 Lastly, in terms of general transposition patterns, the European Commis-
sion ranks Austria among the best performers in the EU. Yet, this overzealo-
usness has recently been questioned by Falkner et al. (2005). Their study 
showed that Austria belonged to the “world of domestic politics”, typically 
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implementing EU legislation on time and correctly when domestic concerns 
do not override European requirements. In fact, “compliance with EU law is 
not a very high-ranking political goal” in Austria (Ibid., p. 333). Experience 
often proved that the obligation to initiate the transposition process was not 
always sufficient to make individual ministries and Länder governments act 
in a timely and correct manner.  
 
Anti-discrimination policy in Austria: the policy legacy 
 What was the Austrian policy legacy in the area of anti-discrimination? 
Anti-discrimination was a relatively foreign policy area in Austria before the 
arrival of the Anti-discrimination directives. The main legal tool existing in 
this area was the Austrian Federal Constitution, which protected all citizens 
equally and requested equal treatment for all citizens before the law (Article 
2 of the Basic Law of the State of 1867 and Article 7 of the Federal Consti-
tutional Act of 1929). The concept (and word) of discrimination does not 
have a long-standing tradition in Austrian legal terminology (Davy, 2004: 3). 
The Constitution, for example, does not use the term when reviewing gro-
unds covered under its own equal treatment clauses.  
 Another tool in place is the Constitutional Act of 1964/59, whereby the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and its protocols are made 
part of the Austrian Constitution. In addition to this, ECHR judgements are 
also legally binding upon Austria. In terms of more specific anti-discrimina-
tion policy, Austria only protected explicitly against gender discrimination in 
the workplace with the Equal Treatment Act of 1979. This law came into 
being after the International Labour Organisation gave a negative opinion on 
the Austrian collective bargaining system concerning equal payment for men 
and women. Additionally, Austrian jurisprudence banned discrimination on 
the basis of race, religion, descent and ethnic origin.  
 Accession to the European Union in 1995 improved this situation. First, 
because by joining the Union, Austria was forced to respect and uphold the 
Union’s basic principles as laid down in Article 6 of the Treaty of the EU, 
including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule 
of law. Second, Austria had to incorporate the acquis communautaire and 
subsequent case law from the ECJ, thus improving its own gender laws and 
introducing nationality anti-discrimination legislation. These changes intro-
duced some of the key concepts in the area of anti-discrimination. Namely, 
those of direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, victimisation, the in-
struction to discriminate, and the existence of an equal treatment body. 
 However, these efforts never culminated in a comprehensive anti-
discrimination act or in the provision of protection rights to any vulnerable 
societal group, save the disabled. Consequently, many concepts were also 
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absent and significant segments of the population were not legally protected 
against discrimination in employment or the access to goods and services. 
Concerned about these issues were the 16 per cent of the Austrian population 
who had a religion other than the dominant Roman Catholicism; the ten per 
cent homosexual population and the nine per cent of people living in Austria 
who did not have Austrian or EU nationality (Statistik Austria, 2001 in Frey, 
2004; Schindlauer, 2004a). Discrimination is commonplace in the realm of 
employment, social affairs and access to goods and services, and was often 
reported and denounced by Austrian civil society. Surprisingly, Austrian pu-
blic perception in the area of anti-discrimination does not consider discrimi-
nation to be a particularly worrying issue. In a 2006 Eurobarometer, sixty-
one per cent of all Austrians interviewed by the European Commission con-
sidered that enough efforts were being made to fight all forms of discrimina-
tion. This was even the case for areas like gender discrimination, which have 
traditionally received more governmental attention. Yet, Austrian women 
still face increasing difficulties to enter the labour market compared to men 
and are often relegated to take less decent “McJobs” (EIRR, 2005: 3). A de-
tailed break-up of domestic measures for each of the grounds further illus-
trates the extent of the domestic gap in this policy area.  
 
Age 
 A study conducted in 2002 scanned the Austrian legal system in search 
for the available means to protect “older” workers, concluding that there was 
no single instrument in place, other than the general ban against discrimina-
tion found in the Constitution. Discrimination for youth workers was never 
considered an issue that required specific legislation. Age, understood in a 
wide sense, was mainly a domestic issue with regards to “older” workers. 
Yet, domestic policy discussions had not featured on the structural changes 
that could affect this type of workers (e.g. de-industrialisation, globalisa-
tion), and therefore solutions lacked. This gap also reflected the social and 
consciousness dimension of the problem, in a period when the number of 
“older” workers in unemployment, and especially in long term unemploy-
ment, steadily increased since the 1990s.  
 There were only a handful of legal regulations in place covering employ-
ment and working conditions of older employees, the most important being 
the Works Constitution Act and the Employment Contract Law Adaptation 
Act. Both provided for specific protection for older workers, in particular re-
garding unjustified dismissals, reduced standard working hours, the use of 
the "partial pensions" scheme, and agreements on "normal" working time re-
ductions. In January 2000, measures were introduced to facilitate part-time 
work for older employees. Also, in the context of the National Action Plan 
for Employment of 2002, and before transposition of the ADDs had begun, 
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the government introduced a programme to raise awareness of the various 
forms of discrimination faced by “older” workers, targeting public, busines-
ses and social partners.  
 The ground of age was politically linked to the Senior Advisory Commit-
tees of the largest political parties, the Pensionistenverband (SPÖ), the Seni-
orenbund (ÖVP) or the Seniorenring (FPÖ). On the 8th of March 2001, they 
agreed to push for a total ban on age discrimination to be included in the Au-
strian Constitution. A draft was circulated at the ministerial level. The politi-
cal senior unions’ proposals were supported by the Bundesministerium für 
Gesundheit, Familie und Jugend (BMSG, the Austrian Federal Ministry for 
Health, Family and Youth Affairs) but before this initiative could reach the 
survey period, new elections in November 2002 halted the process. The is-
sue was then transferred to the Österreich-Konvent, a forum dealing with re-
forms of the Federal Constitution (Interview AT8). However, the debate was 
not reopened in this forum or thereafter, which explains why transposition in 
this area was minimal. On the 11th of June 2003 the government introduced a 
series of legal measures (Budgetbegleitgesetz) aimed at supporting the la-
bour market opportunities of older employees. Finally, the government made 
"active" labour market policy funds available for the training of older 
employees in precarious employment situations. In order to create incentives 
for employers to recruit additional older employees, the part-time scheme for 
such employees was amended and distributed more flexibly. Subsidies for 
enterprises were also introduced. 
 
Disability  
 Discrimination on disability grounds was the most protected element 
prior to the arrival of the ADDs, even though no specific legislation on 
disability discrimination existed in Austria. Protection in this field started 
with the Disabled Persons Employment Act of 1969 (Behinderteneinstellun-
ggesetz), which introduced quotas for disabled and established a fund for 
their support and training. This was complemented with “timid” attempts to 
intervene in welfare issues during the 1980s, e.g. by creating special compa-
nies (Integrationsbetriebe) that hired disabled people in higher proportion 
(Obinger, 2002: 32). Disability was explicitly mentioned in the law on social 
security (Sozialversicherung) or the law on compensation for special sacrifi-
ces or efforts (Versorgung), and on the regulation of dismissal of disabled 
employees (Behindertenausschuss). At the State level, there were additional 
laws on public assistance (Sozialhilfe) and on the rights of people with disa-
bilities (Behindertenrecht). There was even case law dealing with the “rea-
sonable accommodation” of disabled people in the workplace, even though 
jurisprudence did not lead to a specific policy or practice to regulate work 
environments systematically. In 1997, the Federal government inserted a 
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new clause in the constitutional catalogue of human rights prohibiting dis-
crimination of people with disabilities (Article 7(1), sentences 3 and 4). The 
clause even provided for the establishment of sanctions system.  
 However, legal experts considered these “utterly vague” changes insuffi-
cient because private behaviour was not regulated (i.e. non-state actors were 
not included) and sanctions were rarely applied (Davy, 2004: 1). A common 
understanding was reached in 1997 between all parties and the disability 
NGOs to do more in the field. Two bills were drafted but the legislative co-
uld not agree on what to do, despite widespread discrimination in the field 
(Ibid., p. 5). The arrival of the right-wing coalition in 2000 brought an in-
consistent strategy for this ground. The government cut social welfare sche-
mes for disabled people and the termination of several promotion measures 
to support their employment. At the same time, it introduced special 
employment and training programmes for people with disabilities (Behin-
dertenmilliarde). In the context of the 2003 Vocational Training Act (Beruf-
sausbildungsgesetz), it also gave disabled apprentices the opportunity to en-
ter apprenticeship-based occupations; and in the context of the 2002 Aus-
trian Action Plan for Employment, it introduced a programme to overcome 
prejudice. This programme was targeted towards schoolchildren, parents, 
schools, and NGOs. All in all, even though policy and discourse for the di-
sabled had gradually developed in Austria, discrimination on this ground 
was “not effectively prohibited” until the ADDs (Ibid., p. 2).  
 
Race and ethnic origin  
 Austria had a law transposing the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The ICERD 
was ratified in 1972 and modified the Austrian Constitution to introduce pe-
nal provisions in criminal and administrative law against the incitement to 
racial hatred, racist insult and discrimination in the supply of goods and ser-
vices. In Austria, nationality is difficult to acquire, yet it was a condition for 
public sector employment. In the private sector, third country national 
workers could vote for the Works Council but could not be elected to it. 
Furthermore, when reducing their workforce, employers were obliged to 
give priority to non-nationals in redundancies. Also, it is crucial to note that 
regardless of the length of residence, the right to reside in Austria was tied to 
the ability to generate a sufficient per capita income. Most foreign workers 
were entitled to around 30 weeks of unemployment benefit, after which they 
had to be self-sufficient or risked losing residency rights.  
 In practice, however, these laws had a relatively limited impact (Schind-
lauer, 2004b: 2). As Bell notes, this created a situation where foreign 
employees were highly dependent on their employer, were vulnerable to 
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exploitation and were systematically allocated to the worst occupations 
without upward mobility in time to better jobs (2002a: 179). The legal dis-
crimination operating against migrant workers through national policy was 
so comprehensive that it overshadowed any discrimination that might have 
operated at the informal level. This is probably why protection against dis-
crimination based on race and ethnicity was considered far more pressing 
than that afforded to other types of discrimination (Ibid., p. 1). Race and et-
hnic origin have been highly politicised issues and a constant source of 
emotional debates among domestic political forces, especially since the rise 
of Haider’s FPÖ in the mid-1990s. There were notorious public scandals in 
recent years on how immigrants were treated by police forces or on how ac-
cess to municipal housing was persistently blocked to foreigners (Interview 
AT9).  
 
Religion and belief 
 The Constitutional texts (Article 7) and the ICERD were the only speci-
fic equality clauses for the protection of religious freedom and the prohibi-
tion of discrimination on religious grounds. The Penal Code also had a 
Chapter on “crimes against religious peace and the peace of the death”, 
which protected the free exercise of religious freedom. Roman Catholicism 
was the dominant religion in Austria counting 74 percent of the population 
(Schindlauer, 2004a: 1). In addition, 4.7 per cent of the population was Lut-
heran, 4.2 per cent Muslim, 2.2 per cent Eastern Orthodox, and the other 12 
per cent atheist (Statistik Austria, 2001 in Frey, 2004). Some of these religi-
ous groups were granted a long standing history of recognition and their own 
legal framework, notably for the Jewish and Islamic Communities or the 
Lutheran and Christian Orthodox Churches.  
 Employment discrimination on religion or belief grounds was rarely 
reported and was usually difficult to disentangle from cases of race and 
ethnicity discrimination. Nonetheless, the Austrian Islamic Faith Com-
munity, one of the worst integrated communities, stressed the fact that due to 
a longstanding tradition of respect, Islamophobic outbursts are not as com-
mon in Austria as in other European countries. Recently, however, the de-
bates on headscarves in France and Germany sprung over to Austria and 
NGOs reported a surge in troubles for Islamic women and girls in schools 
and the workplace.  
  
Sexual orientation  
 This is probably the most controversial and emotion-loaded ground cove-
red by the ADDs, particularly given Austrian history in the field. Austria 
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was the first country in the world to abolish its death penalty for homosexual 
relations in the late 18th century. By the mid-19th century, however, Austria 
had become one of the most repressive states in Europe. It was only in 1971 
that the total ban on homosexuality was repealed. In exchange for the repeal, 
Austria introduced four anti-homosexual provisions in its Penal Code. 
Firstly, Article 210 prohibited male same-sex prostitution. This was repealed 
in 1989. Secondly, Articles 220 and 221 banned positive information about 
homosexuality and their associations. This was again abolished in 1997. 
Thirdly, Article 209 stipulated a higher age of consent for gay male relations. 
This provision took a longer time to abolish. Under Article 209, about 70 in-
vestigations and approximately 35 convictions were undertaken each year 
(ILGA-Europe, 1999: 4). In 2002, the Austrian Constitutional Court struck it 
down, and by 2003 the ECHR ruled in cases L. and V. v. Austria and S.L. v. 
Austria that Article 209 violated Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and therefore had to be abolished anyway.7 Despite this, 
Austria replaced Article 209 by a new restrictive law that also discriminates 
against the homosexual youth (Article 204). Indeed, the apparently gender-
neutral law has hitherto only been used for male-male relations (Graupner, 
2004: 54).8 In this context, Austria has again been taken in front of the 
ECHR, which issued a further negative ruling for the case Ladner v. Austria 
of October 2004, denouncing these issues9.  
 At the federal level, there were no provisions explicitly mentioning 
sexual orientation (Ibid., 56). The provisions on sexual harassment in both 
the Federal Equal Treatment of Women and Men Act and the Act on Equal 
Treatment of Women and Men in Working Life (for the private sector) could 
have been used for the case of sexual orientation. However, case law never 
developed (Ibid., 64). Additionally, harassment and verbal abuse were not 
explicitly protected, despite constituting a frequent form of discrimination. 
There were some minor exceptions to this panorama (e.g. non-binding Dec-
ree of Guidelines (Richtlinienverordnung) for police behaviour; a symbolical 
and non-binding declaration in Bludenz; the Vienna Youth Protection Act in 
2002; the 2000 Data Protection Act).  
 From this discussion, it is only fair to say that the Austrian anti-
discrimination panorama before the ADDs was relatively empty for most of 
the grounds covered by the Directives. In classical misfit terms (see Falkner 
 
7 Case L. and V. v. Austria has Application nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98, case S.L. v. Aus-
tria has the Application no. 45330/99. 
8 Case Ladner v. Austria has Application no. 18297/03. 
9 The applicants in the case Woditschka and Wilfling v. Austria (Application nos. 69756/01 
and 6306/02) were awarded compensation because Austria had not amended its law in viola-
tions of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. 
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et al. 2005 for a detailed operational definition), this scenery constitutes a 
medium to high level of misfit for the various grounds of discrimination co-
vered by the ADDs. For example, while the grounds of race, ethnicity and 
sexual orientation implied a moderate level of misfit, other grounds such as 
disability-generated high expected costs and a high level of misfit (Casado 
Asensio, 2008). In the presence of a conflict between the domestic policy 
legacy and EU demands, the misfit hypothesis predicts severe delays and 
outcome incorrectness. As will become obvious in the section immediately 
below, this type of conflict was not always sufficient to explain transposition 
in Austria. This is not a surprising finding, fitting well with most studies of 
transposition in the European Union (e.g., Mastenbroek, 2005: 1111). Other 
explanatory variables might be more convincing. For the „world of domestic 
politics“, Falkner et al. (2005) pointed at the study of domestic actor behavi-
our during transposition. The following section looks at their role in transpo-
sition.  
  
The formal transposition process and its outcome 
 Which domestic actors influenced transposition in Austria? An 
endogenous anti-discrimination movement had already taken place in Aus-
tria in 1997, a few years before the Anti-discrimination directives took 
shape. On the occasion of the 1998 United Nations year of human rights, 
Austrian interest groups proposed a comprehensive list of demands to anchor 
the respect of human rights in the state (Forderungskatalog der 
österreichischen NGO’s zu strukturellen Verankerung der Menschenrechte 
in Österreich). Among other things, NGOs demanded the creation of a nati-
onal committee for human rights, the active involvement of NGOs together 
with government and social partners in the application of anti-discrimination 
law and a constitutional clause enshrining the principle of non-discrimina-
tion (Lambda Nachrichten, 1998: 21). Although domestic left-wing parties 
welcomed the measure, the draft law was only ready after the 1999 elections 
and the newly formed ÖVP-FPÖ government did not act upon this (Frey, 
2004).  
 Domestic change in the field of anti-discrimination had to wait until the 
passing of the ADDs. After the directives were passed at the supranational 
level, it was the responsibility of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government to 
transpose them into national law. As will be seen, these were the only two 
veto players able to derail or accelerate the transposition process, and to in-
fluence its outcome in a decisive manner. The responsibility to draft the new 
law fell within the competences of the Ministry of Economy and Labour, the 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (BMWA, Federal Ministry of 
Economy and Labour), controlled by the ÖVP. There were four other minis-
tries involved in the transposition of the ADDs, namely the Federal 
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Chancellery, the Ministry of Justice, the BMGF, all controlled by the ÖVP, 
and the Bundesministerium für Soziale Sichercheit, Generationen und Kon-
sumentenschutz (BMSGK, Federal Ministry of Social Security, Generations 
and Consumer Protection), led by the FPÖ.  
 On the 15th of July 2003, a few days before the deadline of the RD and 
five months before that of the EFD, the BMWA presented a draft proposal to 
implement both directives, published it on its website and started a Be-
gutachtung process until the 8th of September 2003. Around 120 invitations 
to comment on the legislation were sent away by the Ministry (Interview 
AT4). The Ministry received several positions or Stellungnahmen, sent by 
social partners including the IV, the WKÖ, the AK and the ÖGB, as well as 
various NGOs, such as Homosexuelle Initiative (HOSI, Homosexual Initia-
tive), Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus Arbeit (ZARA, Organisation for Ci-
vil Courage and Anti-Racist Work) or the Österreichischer Gehörlosenbund 
(ÖGB, Austrian Federation for the Deaf). 
 After the consultation phase ended, the draft legislation was accepted by 
the Council of Ministers (Minsiterrat) on the 4th of November 2003. Domes-
tic debates among the NGO community, social partners and opposition par-
ties were heated at this time because the government did not change the draft 
laws as much as other actors had suggested during the consultation period. 
As a result, on the 18th of March 2004, the ÖVP agreed that the 
Parliamentary Committee on Equal Treatment (Gleichbehandlungsaus-
schuss) holds an expert hearing to comment on the draft legislation.10 Again, 
the hearing did not lead to significant changes to the draft laws, and on the 
17th of May 2004 the drafts were handed over to the plenary of the National 
Council. On the 26th of May 2004, the Nationalrat passed the text with the 
votes of the governing coalition without further amendments, even though 
intense negotiations with all parties were held until the last moment. The go-
verning parties failed, however, to get the required two-thirds majority to 
pass a Constitutional law to safeguard the independence of the newly estab-
lished Equal Treatment Commission and Equal Treatment Office. This had 
more to do with a general deception among opposition parties with the con-
tents of the laws and the way the process of transposition had been conduc-
ted, than with having independent bodies per se (Interview AT5). In the end, 
the Bundesrat gave its consent to the laws on the 9th of June 2004. 
 
10 Committees in the Nationalrat are significant but rarely charged with devising legisla-
tion. When this is the case, the full parliament is virtually certain to accept the committee’s rec-
ommendations (Gallagher et al., 2005: 67). This explains why committees are not always effec-
tive in Austria and why, despite interest groups’ efforts to “colonise” them, committees rarely 
offer an access point into the political system. Austrian committees can invite individual citi-
zens and experts and can highlight governmental errors, yet, in the end its conclusions may not 
change anything.  
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 In total, three legal acts were passed to transpose the ADDs, covering all 
grounds. The ground of disability, however, was covered by a separate Fede-
ral Act. The Acts were published in the Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetz-
blatt) on the 23rd of June 2004, entering into force on the 1st of July 2004. 
First, for private employment and areas outside the employment field cove-
red by the RD came the Act adopting the Federal Equal Treatment Act 
(Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – GlBG und Änderung des Bundesgesetzes über 
die Gleichbehandlung von Frau und Mann im Arbeitsleben),11 which also 
amended the Act to create the Equal Treatment Commission and the Office 
for Equal Treatment. For public employment at the federal level, came an 
Act amending the Equal Treatment Act (Änderung des Bundes-Gleichbe-
handlungsgesetzes).12 In addition, the government passed an Act on the 
Equal Treatment Commission and the Equal Treatment Office (Bundesgesetz 
über die Gleichbehandlungskommission und die Gleichbehandlungsanwalt-
schaft)13. This happened almost a year after the deadline of the RD and 
seven months after the deadline of the EFD. Thus, Austria was substantially 
delayed in the transposition of both Directives.14  
 Austria also passed a separate Federal Disability Act (Bundes-Behinder-
tengleichstellungsgesetz).15 The so-called “disability package” consisted of a 
bundle of amendments to existing legislation and a new “Disability Equality 
Act” (Behindertengleichstellungesetz) passed by the National Council on the 
6th of July 2005 and by the Federal Council on the 21st of July 2005. In addi-
tion, new amendments to the Act on the Employment of People with Disabi-
lities (Behinderteneinstellungsgesetz), the Federal Disability Act (Bundesbe-
hinderengesetz) and the Act on Federal Social Service (Bundessozialamtge-
setz) were passed between November and December 2005. The “package” 
entered into force on the 1st of January 2006. Although Austria had not 
formally requested an extension of the official deadline for this ground (or 
that of age), the Commission did not act upon it given the inherent difficul-
ties in legislating for this particular ground. Thus, it can be considered that 
Austria transposed this ground (and that of age) in a timely manner. The new 
Disability Act and other amended Acts went beyond the requirements of the 
EFD, including the definition of the concept of “reasonable accommoda-
tion”, the creation of a separate Ombudsperson (Behindertenanwalt), and the 
 
11 BGBl. I Nr. 2004/66 
12 BGBl. I Nr. 2004/65 
13 BGl. I Nr. 2004/66 
14 The use of Federal Law to transpose EU directives is not uncommon in Austria. Around 
41 per cent of EU directives passed between 1995 and 2003 are implemented through Federal 
Law and 59 per cent through governmental decrees (Jenny, Müller, 2005).  
15 BGBl. I Nr. 2005/82  
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establishment of compulsory conciliation and mediation procedures in cases 
of discrimination before an applicant brings a case to court. These procedu-
res would be conducted by the regional offices of the Federal Social Service 
(Bundessozialamt). During the transposition process, NGOs were also con-
sulted several times, albeit without any meaningful impact.  
 The Austrian Länder usually wait for the implementation at the federal 
level before initiating their transposition processes. Taking together state and 
federal laws, there were a total of 21 new or amended laws in Austria. The 
Länder and federal laws differ at times substantially from each other, as re-
gional legislation often afforded more protection than federal laws. This is a 
normal development in Austrian federalism. Since the 1970s, social welfare 
laws vary considerably and keep drifting apart between the Länder and the 
central levels (Obinger, 2002: 18).16 
 The European Commission followed the Austrian transposition process 
and referred it twice to the ECJ. First, after following the normal infringe-
ment procedures for not transposing the RD on time, it issued a Reasoned 
Opinion on the 5th of February 2004. Austria replied it would transpose du-
ring the second quarter of 2004. The Commission, having heard nothing 
more from the Austrian government, decided to take the case to court. The 
ECJ stated that Austria had taken important steps at the federal level but that 
certain aspects falling under the competence of the Länder were still mis-
sing. On the 4th of May 2005, the ECJ ruled that Austria had breached EU 
legislation and was ordered to pay trial costs.17 Second, in December 2004, 
the Commission also referred Austria to the ECJ for failing to transpose the 
EFD on time in some states. The ECJ ruled against it on the 11th of June 
2005 for the specific case of disability, and again for the whole Directive at 
the regional level.18 Austria was again forced to pay trial costs. Another 
negative ruling in February 2006 followed this for the EFD at the Federal le-
vel.19 All these cases referred to the regional level and, as seen before, had 
no impact upon the federal transposition process. 
 In terms of correctness, legal observers considered the final outcome to 
be essentially correct. Some elements were unsatisfactory. The establishment 
of one piece of legislation to combat discrimination against a variety of dif-
 
16 The Länder are indeed significant providers of social protection, social advantages and 
education, and have developed their own set of social legislation. For more details on the 
Länder transposition processes and outcomes see, for example, the work of Frey (2006: 53-5).  
17 Case C-335/04: European Commission v. the Republic of Austria, OJ 9.7.2005/ C 171/5.  
18 Case C-133/05: European Commission v. the Republic of Austria, OJ 11.6.2005/ C 
143/20.  
19 Case C-133/05: European Commission v. the Republic of Austria, OJ 23.2.2006/ C 
143/20.  
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ferent social groups was considered inappropriate by some experts, since the 
practices of discrimination against groups – and their solutions – differ 
widely. The overall provisions planned by the government complied 
formally with the EU Directives (e.g. partial reversal of the burden of proof; 
limited independence of specialized bodies; insufficient involvement of civil 
society during transposition and beyond; sanctions not deterrent enough). 
Over-implementation only took place for the ground of disability and in the 
extension of the equal treatment bodies to all grounds included in the EFD. 
All in all, the Austrian anti-discrimination laws had a strong emphasis upon 
individuals seeking redress, also known as the “individual rights strategy” 
(Niessen, 2003: 255). This renders practical application relatively problema-
tic because in cases of discrimination, a long, uncertain and expensive pro-
cess starts for the most vulnerable side in a discrimination case. This has 
been contested by several observers as being against the general spirit of the 
ADDs (e.g., Frey, 2004; Schindlauer, 2004b). 
 In sum, domestic actors and their political behaviour were determinant in 
explaining the process and outcome of transposition in Austria. The right-
wing coalition government, formed by two veto players, was “hesitant” and 
“over cautious” in transposing the ADDs. The coalition was ideologically 
against the extension of anti-discrimination policy, which leads to delays and 
incorrectness for most of the grounds covered by the directives. The empiri-
cal material presented here also suggests that this is not a definitive 
explanatory variable for all the issues raised during transposition. Indeed, the 
previously described gap in the domestic policy legacy also had a role in 
explaining transposition. Hence, a way forward in the development of the 
“worlds of compliance” typology, in particular with respect to the “world of 
domestic politics”, would explore further both explanatory variables and, 
where possible, attempt their combination. The final section below discusses 
some strategies on how to do so.  
  
Discussion 
 The empirical material presented here illustrated a complex case of con-
flict between domestic level interests, enshrined in domestic policy legacies 
and domestic veto player ideologies, and European requirements, embodied 
in a directive. The case of Austria analysed here belongs to one of the least 
researched “worlds of compliance”, namely the “world of domestic politics”. 
This is the country cluster where such conflicts tend to be resolved in favour 
of domestic interests, rather than by resolute compliance with EU demands. 
Though expected to monitor transposition accurately, supranational actors 
did not act against Austrian delays and incorrect transposition. Indeed, the 
European Commission only opened cases for the regional level. With this 
relative void in supranational monitoring, domestic actors had little external 
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pressure to transpose correctly and in a timely manner. As a result, domestic 
politics took over. The empirical study still begs the question which domestic 
politics and conflicts explained transposition process and outcome? 
 The explanatory variables highlighted by the “worlds” typology were 
useful in understanding transposition of the two anti-discrimination directi-
ves in Austria. The review of the status quo ante panorama of Austrian legi-
slation and policy revealed that transposing the main provisions of the ADDs 
would not be an easy task. What is more, the ADDs constituted two pieces 
of legislation that went against the ideologies of a domestic right-wing coa-
lition government. These players would have not created such laws had it 
not been for the EU impulse and were not eager to transpose them on time 
and correctly. Both perspectives were described here for the case of Austria. 
The empirical study thus suggested that in order to further refine the “worlds 
of compliance” typology, in particular the “world of domestic politics”, 
policy legacies and political ideologies need to be brought together. Fur-
thermore, both approaches would be even more useful if combined. 
 Bringing domestic actors to the forefront raises the question of which ac-
tors actually matter during transposition (Treib, 2003: 524). Among all rele-
vant actors, governments and political parties in government ought to be 
analysed since they are legally responsible for transposition – either as “key 
translators” (Laffan, 2005) or “norm takes” (Archarya, 2004). The inclusion 
and analysis of other domestic actors depends on the domestic power struc-
ture, which usually varies across policy areas (Steunenberg, 2007: 25) and 
over time (e.g. as elections modify incumbent actors). Hence, domestic as 
well as supranational actors have to be considered in terms of their formal or 
informal leverage during the transposition process. That is, the study of do-
mestic actors has to be based on whether an actor has a veto player status or 
not (e.g. Tsebelis, 1995, 2002; Haverland, 2000); as was done in this paper. 
In addition to this analysis, and following the recent work of Steunenberg 
(2007), a distinction could be drawn among veto players and agenda setters. 
Agenda setters possess the right of initiating transposition and so are likely 
to influence the outcome of transposition in different ways than other veto 
players do. The interaction between agenda setters and veto players could 
then be brought together with the typology of political ideologies developed 
by Treib (2003; see also Falkner et al., 2005), applied here for the ÖVP-FPÖ 
coalition. In doing so, a richer account of domestic behaviour would be at-
tained for the study of transposition. In turn, more interesting (and accurate) 
predictions could be derived regarding the process and outcome of transpo-
sition. 
 Bringing back the controversial policy legacy perspective, commonly 
studied under the label of the misfit hypothesis, may seem less pressing. Se-
veral works have shown that the hypothesis is static and inaccurate, and so 
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unable to predict transposition processes and/or outcomes (see Casado Asen-
sio 2008). Nonetheless, a deep analysis of the policy legacy before transpo-
sition kicks out is necessary to understand the situation ex ante. What is 
more, a certain level of misfit is necessary to have a transposition process 
and outcome for researchers to analyse. In bringing back this perspective, it 
would be interesting to look at the impact of deeper ideational elements, es-
sential in the study of social policy, labour law and anti-discrimination legi-
slation (Ibid., p. 9), and to combine this with the classical analysis of mate-
rial-organisational costs, as developed by, e.g. Falkner et al. (2005). A tho-
rough account of the policy legacy thus obtained, could be then integrated as 
one more variable in the analysis of domestic actor behaviour alongside their 
ideology.  
 These suggestions are bound to generate new research questions in the fi-
eld of EU transposition studies – and beyond, to the areas of implementation 
and Europeanisation. Novel theoretical models and fresh empirical data ge-
nerated through carefully selected case studies will then have to speak about 
whether policy legacies and veto players ought to remain as separate 
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